Aircraft Ground Deicing - Failure to remove contamination from an airframe and/or to protect it from acquiring further contamination before it becomes airborne may result in sudden loss of control at or shortly after take off. In the case of aircraft with rear mounted engines, any ice on the inner wings of an aircraft at take off may be shed and ingested into the engines causing a partial or total loss of thrust.
On 13 December 2017, control of an ATR 42-300 was lost just after it became airborne at night from Fond-du-Lac and it was destroyed by the subsequent terrain impact. Ten occupants sustained serious injuries from which one later died and all others sustained minor injuries.
Aircraft Ground Deicing
The Investigation found that the accident was primarily attributable to pre-takeoff ice contamination of the airframe with an inappropriate pilot response then preventing an achievable recovery. It was found that significant airframe ice accretion had gone undetected during an inadequate pre-flight inspection and that there was a more widespread failure to recognize airframe icing risk.
Additional Issues
It should be noted that fan blade ice which may be accumulated after the pre-start visual inspection, including while the engines are running at low thrust prior to take off, is removed by following prescribed engine handling procedures.
Note: Although the Association of European Airlines (AEA) ceased to exist in 2016, the most recent of their publications still contain some relevant information. Readers are cautioned to validate the recommendations of these guidebooks using more current information sources.
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( LockA locked padlock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. On January 13, 1982, an Air Florida Boeing 737-200 took off in daylight from runway 36 at Washington National in moderate snow but then stalled before hitting a bridge and vehicles and continuing into the river below after just one minute of flight killing most of the
occupants and some people on the ground. The accident was attributed entirely to a combination of the actions and inactions of the crew in relation to the prevailing adverse weather conditions and, crucially, to the failure to select engine anti ice on which led to over reading of actual engine thrust.
On 26 December 2007, the crew of a Bombardier Challenger 604 which had received a 2-stage ground de/anti icing treatment lost roll control as the aircraft got airborne from a snow-covered runway at Almaty in freezing mist and light snow conditions and it
crashed within the airport perimeter before continuing through the perimeter fence and catching fire. The Investigation concluded that the loss of control was probably caused by contamination of the wing leading edge with frozen deposits during the take off roll as a result of the crew's decision not to select wing anti-ice contrary to applicable procedures.
On January 31, 2005, the pilot of a Cessna 208 which had just taken off from Helsinki lost control of their aircraft as the flaps were retracted and the aircraft stalled, rolled to the right and crashed within the airport perimeter.
The Investigation found that the take off had been made without prior airframe de/anti icing and that accumulated ice and snow on the upper wing surfaces had led to airflow separation and the stall, a condition which the pilot had failed to recognize or respond appropriately to
for undetermined reasons. In respect of engines, frozen deposits within the intakes including on the fan blades of jet engines may detach and be ingested by the same engine(s) during the subsequent application of take off power, with the attendant risk of adverse effects on engine performance during
the potentially critical stage of initial climb, including the possibility of engine flameout. On 2 April 2012, the crew of an ATR72-200 which had just taken off from Tyumen lost control of their aircraft when it stalled after the flaps were retracted and did not recover before it crashed and caught fire killing or seriously injuring all occupants.
The Investigation found that the Captain knew that frozen deposits had accumulated on the airframe but appeared to have been unaware of the danger of not having the airframe de-iced. It was also found that the crew had not recognized the stall when it occurred and had overpowered the stick pusher and pitched up.
On 13 January 2016 ice was found on the upper and lower wing surfaces of a Boeing 777-300ER about to depart in the late morning from Lisbon in CAVOK conditions and 10°C. As Lisbon had no de-ice facilities, it was towed to a location where the sun would melt the ice more quickly but during poorly-planned manoeuvring, one of the wingtips was damaged by contact with an obstruction.
The Investigation attributed the ice which led to the problematic re-positioning to the operator's policy of tanking most of the return fuel on the overnight inbound flight where it had become cold-soaked. On 4 March 2019, a Boeing 767-300 crew lost directional control of their aircraft as speed reduced following their touchdown at Halifax and were unable to prevent it being rotated 180° on the icy surface before coming to a stop facing the runway landing threshold.
The Investigation found that the management of the runway safety risk by the airport authority had been systemically inadequate and that the communication of what was known by ATC about the runway surface condition had been incomplete.
A number of subsequent corrective actions taken by the airport authority were noted. On 12 March 2005, the crew of a BAe 146-300 climbing out of Frankfurt lost elevator control authority and an un-commanded descent at up to 4500 fpm in a nose high pitch attitude occurred before descent was arrested and control regained.
After landing using elevator trim to control pitch, significant amounts of de/anti-icing fluid residues were found frozen in the elevator/stabilizer and aileron/rudder gaps. The Investigation confirmed that an accumulation of hygroscopic polymer residues from successive applications of thickened de/anti ice fluid had expanded by re-hydration and then expanded further by freezing thus obstructing the flight controls.
First of all, the aircraft must be inspected for signs of contaminant already adhering to surfaces and where found on surfaces which must be free of contaminant, it must be removed using a suitable ground de-icing fluid.
On January 17, 2004 a Cessna 208 Caravan operated by Georgian Express, took off from Pellee Island, Ontario, Canada, at a weight significantly greater than the maximum allowed and with ice visible on the airframe. Shortly after take off, the pilot lost control of the aircraft and it crashed into a frozen lake.
On 11 January 2017, control of a Cessna Citation 560 departing Oslo on a short positioning flight was lost control during flap retraction when a violent nose-down maneuver occurred. The First Officer took control when the Captain did not react and recovered with a 6 g pullout which left only 170 feet of ground clearance.
A MAYDAY - subsequently canceled when control was regained - was declared and the intended flight was then completed without further incident. The Investigation concluded that tailplane stall after the aircraft was not de-iced prior to departure was the probable cause of the upset.
Use of thickened Type 2 and Type 4 ground de/anti icing fluids has sometimes resulted in fluid residues accumulating in aerodynamically quiet areas of the external airframe structure, particularly in the gap between the leading edge of the elevator and the horizontal stabilizer and also in the
gap between the leading edge of the ailerons and the wing structure. When this residue is subsequently re-hydrated and then exposed to sub zero temperatures in flight, it freezes and can then result in primary flight control restrictions on aircraft types such as the BAE 146/Avro RJ series and the DC9/MD 80/90 series
which have at least some unpowered flight controls. After a number of Serious Incident Reports, many Operators of affected aircraft types have adapted their aircraft maintenance procedures to carry out appropriate inspections and residue removal when these fluids have been applied.
Secondly, the prevailing weather conditions must be assessed. If further adherence of contaminant to the airframe surfaces is currently occurring or anticipated prior to the time at which it is expected that the aircraft will get airborne, then a suitable ground anti-icing fluid should be applied.
In both cases, the time after the start of fluid treatment from which protection is provided by the fluids applied depends upon the prevailing conditions. The fluids are designed to shear off the aircraft surfaces to which they have been applied no later than the point at which the aircraft becomes airborne.
This means that the ground application of fluids has no effect on the risks which arise from the accretion of frozen deposits on the aircraft at any time after take off. On 9 April 2008, a BAe Jetstream 41 departed Aberdeen in snow and freezing conditions after the Captain had elected not to have the airframe de/anti iced having noted the delay this would incur.
During the climb in IMC, pitch control became problematic and an emergency was declared. Full control was subsequently regained in warmer air. The Investigation concluded that it was highly likely that prior to take off, slush and/or ice had been present on the horizontal tail surfaces and that, as the aircraft entered colder air at altitude, this contamination had restricted the mechanical pitch control.
On 4 January 2002, a Bombardier Challenger 604 became very quickly uncontrollable as the crew attempted to rotate for lift off at Birmingham and within a few seconds it had crashed inverted near the airport passenger terminal killing all on board.
A rigorous investigation found that an uncontrollable roll had occurred after an aerodynamic stall attributable to frost on the wings which had been noticed but apparently not considered indicative of a need for de-icing. The exclusively FAA promoted notion of polished frost may have played a part in the pilots decision making and was considered to be dangerously misleading.
On 7 November 2016, severe airframe vibrations occurred to an Avro RJ-100 which, following ground de icing, was accelerating in the climb a few minutes after departing from Gothenburg. The crew were able to stop the vibrations by reducing speed but they declared an emergency and returned to land where significant quantities of ice were found and considered to have been the cause of the vibrations.
The Investigation concluded that the failure of the de-icing operation in this case had multiple origins which were unlikely to be location specific and generic safety recommendations were therefore made. On 4 March 2013, a Beechcraft Premier 1A stalled and crashed soon after taking off from Annemasse.
The Investigation concluded that the loss of control was attributable to taking off with frozen deposits on the wings which the professional pilot flying the privately-operated aircraft had either not been aware of or had considered insignificant.
It was found that the aircraft had been parked outside overnight and that overnight conditions, particularly the presence of a substantial quantity of cold-soaked fuel, had been conducive to the formation of frost and that no airframe de/anti icing facilities had been available at
Annemasse On 4 March 2016, the flight crew of an ATR72-500 decided to depart from Manchester without prior ground de/anti icing treatment judging it unnecessary despite the presence of frozen deposits on the airframe and from rotation onwards found that manual forward control column input beyond
trim capability was necessary to maintain controlled flight. The aircraft was subsequently diverted. The Investigation found that the problem had been attributable to ice contamination on the upper surface of the horizontal tailplane. It was considered that the awareness of both pilots of the risk of airframe icing had been inadequate.
On 04 November 2003, the crew of a de Havilland DHC-8-100 which had been de/anti iced detected a pitch control restriction as rotation was attempted during take off from Ottawa and successfully rejected the take off from above V1.
The Investigation concluded that the restriction was likely to have been the result of a remnant of clear ice migrating into the gap between one of the elevators and its shroud when the elevator was moved trailing edge up during control checks and observed that detection of such clear ice
remnants on a critical surface wet with de-icing fluid was difficult. On 27 December 1991, an MD-81 took off after airframe ground de/anti icing treatment but soon afterwards both engines began surging and both then failed.
A successful crash landing with no fatalities was achieved four minutes after take off after the aircraft emerged from cloud approximately 900 feet above terrain. There was no post-crash fire. The Investigation found that undetected clear ice on the upper wing surfaces had been ingested into both engines during rotation and initiated engine surging.
Without awareness of the aircraft's automated thrust increase system, the pilot response did not control the surging and both engines failed. Please note, Aircraft Spruce's personnel are not certified aircraft mechanics and can only provide general support and ideas, which should not be relied upon or implemented in lieu of consulting an A&P or other qualified technician.
Aircraft Spruce assumes no responsibility or liability for any issue or problem which may arise from any repair, modification or other work done from this knowledge base. Any product eligibility information provided here is based on general application guides and we recommend always referring to your specific aircraft parts manual, the parts manufacturer or consulting with a qualified mechanic.
On 28 November 2004, the crew of a Bombardier Challenger 601 lost control of their aircraft soon after getting airborne from Montrose and it crashed and caught fire killing three occupants and seriously injuring the other three.
The Investigation found that the loss of control had been the result of a stall caused by frozen deposits on the upper wing surfaces after the crew had failed to ensure that the wings were clean or use the available ground de/anti ice service.
It was concluded that the pilots' lack of experience of winter weather operations had contributed to their actions/inactions. Toll Free: 877-477-7823 Customer Service: 800-861-3192 Fax: 800-329-3020
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